Examples of functions with this property, and operations on functions that preserve this property are given.
The connections with Pratt's risk aversion are presented.
It is shown that the premium paid to avoid many-outcome lotteries is an increasing percentage of the scale of the lottery if s(X, W) is increasing for all W.
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INTRODUCTION
Let u(w) be a utility function for wealth, w. Pratt
[1] has shown that r(w) = -u"(w)/u'(w) can be interpreted as a measure of local risk aversion at-i particular wealth position. He shows that if r is decreasing with w, the risk premium (expected monetary value minus cash equivalent) for a particular lottery will be a decreasing function of pre-lottery wealth. Pratt makes the normative observation that many decisionmakers would feel they ought to pay less for insurance against a given risk the greater their assets. Such a decisionmaker will want to choose a utility function for which r(w) is decreasing.
In contemplating their willingness to pay insurance premiums, some decisionmakers might find it easier to define their preferences in a somewhat different context.
Consider an individual faced with what we shall call a simple lottery, a lottery with but two payoffs, one of which is zero. This lottery will result in a loss X (gain y) with probability p, but no change in wealth with probability 1 -p. Given his current wealth, how would the insurance premium (certainty equivalent) he would pay (accept) to avoid the lottery vary with the size of X?
SIZE-OF-RISK AVERSION
We would expect that many individuals would be willing to pay a larger premium as a percentage of the fair actuarial value of an unfavorable simple lottery the greater is the magnitude of the loss included in the lottery. For example, if such an individual would be willing to pay $130 to insure against a .1 probability of a loss of $1,000, he would pay more than $260 to insure against a $2,000 loss with the same probability. In some sense, then, these individuals are more averse to risk the greater is the size of the potential loss.
Similarly, they may also feel that the certainty equivalent of favorable simple lotteries is a proportionally decreasing function of the gain y. Such behavior will be called size-of-risk aversion.
More precisely, let W be the initial wealth position.
Let w represent total possible assets, so that only positive values need be considered. Let
define y. the insurance premium one is just willing to pay to insure against a loss of size X that is incurred with probability, p. 0 < p < 1. A utility function is sizeof-risk averse for losses if YA is an increasing function of X, for al, X > 0. Proof: Set
After substitu-;on, I) becomes
By differentiatinq yA with respect to X, we find 
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We differentiate the log of both sides of (4) to get
From (5) and (6), we must show
Then y is a function of p. Inequality Proof.
sI(x;W) = x fu 1 (W+x)
This theorem is the equivalent of Pratt's Theorem 3, which he uses to help him find examples of functions that display risk aversion.
In general, composites and sums of size-of-risk averse functions are not size-of-risk averse. Consider the It is even simpler to show that s(x, W), like Pratt's measures of risk aversion, are not affected by linear transformations of the utility function. (12) s(x,l) = (1+x)r(l+x) -r(l+x) = r*(l+x) -r(l+r).
Thus an individual has size-of-risk aversion if the Adifference between proportional and absolute risk aversion (measured in units of initial wealth) is increasing.
It can be shown that for very small losses and gains any utility function that shows risk aversion and that has u"' continuous or locally bounded will display size-of-risk aversion.
III
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RISK AVERSION WITH RESPECT TO SCALE OF LOTTERY
At times an individual may be faced with a lottery that gives him a positive probability of a number of different outcomes. It may be of interest to know how the I amount that he will pay to avoid or accept to give up the lottery will vary with a scale parameter that multiplies by all the possible payoffs.
If the risk premium TT(W, A) as a proportion of x is to increase with x, for an arbitrary fair gamble 7, it suffices to have s(x; W) increasing for all W in [0, + ®).
This will be the case for example, if u(w) = -e -w By reference to the table, this is a somewhat stronger condition than the hypotheses of the theorem below. Let E(T) = 0 and suppose w is defined by (14) or (15) must be strict. We combine (14) and (15) to complete the proof.
This result can be extended to nonneutral gambles.
Since ECI -pz) *01 -is increasing, so TrCW, xf?) a in increasing.
CHOICE OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION
If individuals wish to make choices that reflect sizeof-risk aversion, this may influence the choice of the utility function they use to represent their preferences.
There will be no problem with utility functions that have constant risk aversion. For decreasing risk aversion to be satisfactory in this regard it suffices that they have nondecreasing proportional risk aversion. A counterexample shows that a weaker condition is not sufficient.
The utility function u(w) = -e I/ w shows decreasing proportional risk aversion as well as decreasing risk aversion. Measuring w in units of $100,000, if initial wealth is $10,000 there will not be size-of-risk aversion for simple lotteries offering gains of more than $15,000.
There are many relationships and complementarities between the two noncepts, risk aversion and size-of-risk aversion. If the former concept is a bit more general and tractable, the latter may be better understood on an intuitive basis. From a normative standpoint, we believe that consideration of size-of-risk aversion as well as of risk aversion should be part of the process through which a utility function is chosen.
